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TAXING RECIPROCAL TRUSTS: CHARTING A
DOCTRINE'S FALL FROM GRACE
ELENA MARTY-NELSON*
No area of tax law more vividly illustrates the dichotomy
between substance and form than the reciprocal trust doctrine.
When settlors began creating "crossed trusts" to evade estate tax
liability, the Internal Revenue Service obtained Supreme Court
precedent in United States v. Estate of Grace allowing it to tax
the "economic reality" of such trusts. But subsequent cases have
cast aspersion on this "substance-over-form" rationale, which
becomes even more problematic when extended to income and
gift taxation of such trusts. In this Article, Professor Marty-
Nelson revitalizes Grace, urging that courts refrain from further
dismantling a doctrine that serves useful purposes even outside
tax law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Internal Revenue Service (the "Service") has long main-
tained that it is entitled to strip away the legal "form" of a
transaction in order to reveal the transaction's "substance" for pur-
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poses of calculating the proper tax.' As the Supreme Court observed
in the context of a tax-free corporate reorganization, to allow form to
govern taxability would "exalt artifice above reality" and thwart the
intended purpose of statutory provisions.! This lofty endorsement
notwithstanding, the Service's cherished "substance-over-form" view
has, in litigation, achieved no better than mixed success depending
on the particular corollary principle (such as "step transaction,"3
"sham transaction,. 4 "business purpose,"5 and "implied agreement"6)
1. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935). The author is well aware of
the current controversy surrounding the appropriateness of the use of any type of pur-
posive approach, including the application of anti-abuse rules such as substance-over-form,
in statutory interpretation. Justice Scalia's textualist approach to statutory interpretation
is credited as a catalyst for this debate. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, "Plain Meaning":
Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
401, 401-02 (1994). The discussion also has permeated the tax literature. See, e.g., Debo-
rah A. Geier, Commentary: Textualism and Tax Cases, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 445 passim
(1993); John A. Miller, Indeterminacy, Complexity, and Fairness: Justifying Rule Simplifi-
cation in the Law of Taxation, 68 WASH. L. REV. 1 passim (1993). Professor Daniel
Halperin recently described the reasoning of the two tax camps on this issue. See Daniel
Halperin, Compendium on Anti-Abuse Rules, Are Anti-Abuse Rules Appropriate?, 48 TAX
LAW. 807 (1995). In one camp, Professor Halperin notes, are those who insist that
"'taxpayers are entitled to take the benefit of unintentional ... glitches in the law... until
the government somehow stops them.'" Id. at 807 (quoting Lee A. Sheppard, Partnership
Antiabuse Rule: Dirty Minds Meet Mrs. Gregory, 64 TAX NOTES, July 18, 1994, at 295,
296). In the other camp, according to Professor Halperin, are those who believe "that a
purposive approach is required if we are to maintain confidence in the equitable imple-
mentation of the tax law and avoid the idea that it is all just a game which is to be won by
the most clever and the best advised." Id. Professor Halperin sides with the latter view.
See id.
This Article is confined to an examination of the reciprocal trust doctrine, a corollary
principle to the "anti-abuse" substance-over-form rule. In examining the reciprocal trust
doctrine, the Article does not address the arguments against application of judicial or
regulatory anti-abuse rules. Rather, an underlying premise of the Article is that purposive
analysis, including application of anti-abuse rules, is necessary for proper administration of
the tax laws.
2. Gregory, 293 U.S. at 470.
3. Under the "step transaction" doctrine, each step in the transaction is collapsed
into one transaction, consequently ensuring that the substance of the transaction controls
over its form. See Jack F. Williams, Rethinking Bankruptcy and Tax Policy, 3 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 153, 187 n.235 (1995). For an interesting article comparing the use of the
step transaction doctrine for tax purposes in the United States and the United Kingdom,
see Karen B. Brown, Applying Circular Reasoning to Linear Transactions: Substance over
Form Theory in U.S. and U.K. Tax Law, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 169 (1992).
4. "Sham transaction" has been defined by the Tax Court as "the expedient of
drawing up papers to characterize transactions contrary to objective economic realities
and which have no economic significance beyond expected tax benefits." Falsetti v. Com-
missioner, 85 T.C. 332, 347 (1985). For an article criticizing the lack of analysis utilized by
certain courts applying the sham transaction doctrine, see Karen Nelson Moore, The Sham
Transaction Doctrine: An Outmoded and Unnecessary Approach to Combating Tax A void-
ance, 41 FLA. L. REV. 659 (1989).
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subject to review.7 This Article focuses on the struggle for judicial
acceptance of yet another variant on the "substance-over-form" prin-
ciple-the reciprocal trust doctrine.
The reciprocal trust doctrine, which reached its high-water mark
in the landmark Supreme Court case of United States v. Estate of
Grace,8 represents the Service's effort to ensure that when two
crossed9 trusts"0 are simultaneously created, the tax consequences re-
5. The "business purpose" doctrine is used by the courts to determine whether the
transaction entered into had a purpose other than obtaining tax benefits. See Rice's Toy-
ota World, Inc. v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 89, 91 (4th Cir. 1985).
6. Courts have used the "implied agreement" doctrine where the form would not
cause taxation, but an "understanding, express or implied" among the parties suggests that
the taxpayer should be taxed. See, e.g., Estate of Paxton v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 785,
808-14 (1986).
7. The substance-over-form doctrine's success in recharacterizing transactions is also
somewhat dependent on which party, the Service or the taxpayer, is asserting the doctrine.
The Service is typically more successful in asserting it than the taxpayer because courts
have reasoned that the taxpayer chose his form and thus should not subsequently be al-
lowed to disavow it. See Michael E. Baillif, The Return Consistency Rule: A Proposal for
Resolving the Substance-Form Debate, 48 TAx LAW. 289, 289 (1995). For a listing of areas
of the tax law affected by the substance-over-form doctrine, see 1 BORIS I. BrITKER &
LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GiFTs 4.3.3 (2d
ed. 1989). This Article is limited to an examination of the reciprocal trust doctrine, a cor-
ollary to the common-law substance-over-form anti-abuse rule. There are also specific
anti-abuse rules in the Code and regulatory anti-abuse rules. For example, § 482 of the
Code provides that:
[i]n any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or not
incorporated, whether or not organized in the United States, and whether or not
affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the
[Service] may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits,
or allowances between or among such organizations... if [it] determines that
such distribution... is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes.
I.R.C. § 482 (1994). Similarly, § 1.701-2 of the regulations permit the Service to recast
partnership transactions that make inappropriate use of subchapter K. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.701-2(a) (1996). Both of those rules have been the subject of various articles and
commentaries. See, e.g., Halperin, supra note 1, at 812-14.
8. 395 U.S. 316 (1969).
9. For a discussion of when trusts are deemed to be crossed, see infra text preceding
note 34. Although the trusts need not be mirror images of one another, they must be
"interrelated." See Grace, 395 U.S. at 322.
10. The Restatement (Second) of Trusts defines a trust as a "fiduciary relationship with
respect to property, subjecting the person by whom the title to the property is held to equi-
table duties to deal with the property for the benefit of another person." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (1959). The Restatement provides that where "the term 'trust'
is used without any qualifying adjective it denotes a ... [private] express trust." Id. § 2
cmt. a. Generally, a private express trust is a private trust that does not qualify as a pri-
vate charitable trust. See id. In addition to express trusts, there are also constructive
trusts and resulting trusts. For a detailed discussion of constructive and resulting trusts,
see V-VA AUSTIN WAKELAND SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS, §§ 461-552 and §§ 404-60, respectively, (4th ed. 1987). This Article is limited to
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flect the "economic reality" of the situation and not the artificial ef-
fects of the nominally created trust arrangements.1 Prior to Grace,
in a prototypical crossed-trust arrangement, taxpayer A, in order to
shelter some of his assets from estate tax liability, placed those assets
in a trust for which he named B, his spouse, as the beneficiary. Si-
multaneously, an identical trust was funded with B's assets, naming
A as the beneficiary. In addressing these and like arrangements, the
Grace Court held that the reciprocal trust doctrine should apply to
"uncross" the trusts (and to "return" the assets to their respective
estates for purposes of estate tax liability) when two conditions are
met: (1) the trusts are "interrelated," and (2) "the arrangement, to
the extent of mutual value, leaves the settlors in approximately the
same economic position as they would have been in had they created
trusts naming themselves as life beneficiaries."' 2
The Grace test has since been criticized. The first prong of the
test suffers from an insurmountable vagueness: Grace offers little
guidance on how to determine when two trusts are "interrelated"-
an oversight that makes the test hard for courts to apply and easy for
creative taxpayers to evade.'4 The second prong of the test fares little
better. Post-Grace interpretations have read the "mutual benefit"
requirement so narrowly as to render it virtually inapplicable to all
but the precise facts of the Grace decision." A prime example of this
phenomenon, the Sixth Circuit's decision in Estate of Green v. United
States,6 restores full license to reciprocal trusts-so long as the set-
tlor/taxpayer's retained economic interest is anything other than the
benefit specifically disallowed by Grace.7
Since the majority of the cases dealing with crossed trusts in-
exploring private express trusts.
As developed below, the doctrine could apply even if the arrangement was less than a
formal trust. See Exchange Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 694 F.2d 1261, 1267 (Fed.
Cir. 1982) (applying the reciprocal trust doctrine to uncross a custodial arrangement under
the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act).
11. See Grace, 395 U.S. at 320-21.
12. Id. at 324.
13. See, e.g., Bischoff v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 32, 45-46 (1977); cf. Exchange Bank,
694 F.2d at 1268 (refusing to accept the taxpayer's literal reading of the Grace decision
because the Supreme Court did not intend to close one loophole while leaving open a re-
lated one).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 66-91.
15. See, e.g., Estate of Green v. United States, 68 F.3d 151, 156 (6th Cir. 1995): Jona-
than G. Blattmachar & Georgiana J. Slade, Partial Interests-GRATs, GRUTs, and
QPRTs, 836-1st Tax Mgmt. (BNA), at A-1, A-19 to A-20 (1995); see also infra text ac-
companying notes 34-65 (discussing Grace and its weaknesses).
16. 68 F.3d 151 (6th Cir. 1995).
17. See id. at 154.
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18volve attempts to avoid estate tax inclusion of transferred assets,
Part II explores in detail the estate tax implications of the reciprocal
trust doctrine.19 This portion of the Article examines how, since
Grace, several significant decisions apparently allow crossed trusts to
flout the estate tax system once again. Crossed trusts also can be
used to avoid certain federal income and gift tax rules." Part III ex-
amines the reciprocal trust doctrine's role when crossed trusts are
used to avoid the grantor trust rules" for income tax purposes,22 an
area in which application of the doctrine is particularly problematic
in light of Congress's near dominance of the grantor trust rules and
courts' hesitancy to vary the intricate legislative scheme. Part IV of
the Article analyzes the use of crossed trusts to skirt the federal gift
tax,23 with particular attention devoted to efforts to use crossed trusts
to stretch the annual $10,000-per-donee gift tax exclusion. 4
Part V of the Article offers a fuller explanation of the demise of
the reciprocal trust doctrine and discusses a variety of policy con-
cerns raised by the doctrine's collapse.' The Article concludes that a
revitalization of the substance-over-form doctrine in this area, via a
more liberal application of the reciprocal trust doctrine, would better
advance the proper application of the tax laws.
II. CROSSED TRUSTS TO AVOID ESTATE TAX INCLUSION
When a grantor establishes a trust and retains no interest
(beneficial or otherwise) in the trust assets, she generally has re-
moved those assets from her gross estate for federal tax purposes.26
18. See, e.g., United States v. Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316 (1969); Lehman v. Com-
missioner, 109 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1940).
19. See infra notes 26-133 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 134-220 and accompanying text.
21. Sections 673 through 679 of the Internal Revenue Code (the "Code") contain the
rules for determining when a trust is a "grantor trust" subjecting the grantor to tax liabil-
ity. Unless otherwise noted, all references to sections herein are to the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, as amended.
22. See infra notes 134-66 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 167-220 and accompanying text.
24. Section 2503(b) provides that "[iun the case of gifts (other than gifts of future in-
terests in property) made to any person by the donor during the calendar year, the first
$10,000 of such gifts to such person shall not, for purposes of subsection (a) [regarding
taxation of gifts], be included in the total amount of gifts made during such year." I.R.C.
§ 2503(b) (1994). The annual exclusion is $20,000 if the donor spouse and the non-donor
spouse consent. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2513-1 (1996).
25. See infra notes 221-50 and accompanying text.
26. See Joseph M. Dodge, Transfers with Retained Interests and Powers, 50-5th Tax
Mgmt. (BNA), at A-1, A-2 (1992).
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Put another way, if a grantor of a trust transfers assets during her
lifetime to an irrevocable trust managed by a third-party trustee for
the benefit of others with no strings attached, the transferred assets
are not included in the grantor's estate for estate tax purposes at the
time of death."
Where, however, the grantor retains certain prohibited interests,
controls, or powers over the transferred assets, the ostensibly trans-
ferred assets are included in the grantor's estate for estate tax
28 2purposes. Sections 2036, 2037, and 2038 of the Internal Revenue
Code (the "Code")-referred to as the "retained interests and pow-
ers sections"29-- set forth the types of "strings" that could require an
irrevocable lifetime transfer to be includible in the transferor's es-
tate."
The majority of estate tax cases addressing crossed trusts involve
application of § 2036, which provides in pertinent part:
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all
property to the extent of any interest therein of which the
decedent has at any time made a transfer ... , by trust or
otherwise, under which he has retained for his life or for
any period not ascertainable without reference to his death
(1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the
income from, the property, or
(2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any
person, to designate the persons who shall possess or
27. See id. There could, of course, be a gift tax due on the transfer. The gift tax could
be ameliorated or eliminated, however, by virtue of the unlimited marital deduction, any
remaining unified credit, or even by the annual exclusion for any present interest under
the $10,000 annual exclusion amounts. See generally I.R.C. § 2523 (providing for unlimited
marital deduction); id. § 2501 (describing the gift tax); id. § 2503 (setting forth $10,000
annual exclusion); id. § 2010 (setting forth the estate tax credit).
Section 2035, which includes transfers within three years of death, is not implicated in
these cases. See id. § 2035. Generally, § 2035 includes in the estate transfers made within
three years of death if those interests would have been included in the decedent's gross
estate under §§ 2036, 2037, or 2038. See id § 2035. For a thorough discussion of the effects
of § 2035, see generally Peter S. Cremer, The 1981 Act and Section 2035: Problems and
Possibilities, 35 TAX LAW. 389 (1982).
28. See generally RICHARD B. STEPHENS ET AL., FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT
TAXATION 4.08-.10 (Warren, Gorham & Lamont ed., 6th ed. 1991) (discussing §§ 2036,
2037 and 2038).
29. Dodge, supra note 26, at A-3.
30. See Dennis I. Belcher & James D. Bridgeman, Defective May Be More Effective:
The Tax Advantages ofIntentional Grantor Trusts, PROBS. & PROP., Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 24,
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enjoy the property or the income therefrom."
Section 2036(a)(1) essentially pulls back into a transferor's gross
estate property he transferred into a trust during his lifetime to the
extent he retains possession, enjoyment, or the right to income from
the property. In operation, § 2036(a)(1) requires, for example, inclu-
sion of assets in the grantor/decedent's estate when a grantor
transfers assets to an irrevocable trust for the benefit of his lineal de-
scendants but retains a life estate for himself. In such a case, the
value of the entire trust-not just the value of the retained life in-
come-must be included in the estate of the grantor/decedent for
estate tax purposes.32 Section 2036(a)(2), by contrast, governs situa-
tions in which the grantor/decedent-while not retaining an income
interest-continues to have a measure of control over the property.
A crossed trust occurs when a grantor receives a life income in-
terest not from a trust that he has created (which would make it
subject to § 2036(a)(1)), but from a trust created by another grantor
(often a spouse or other close relative). The designation "crossed
trust" derives from the first trust's life income beneficiary's simulta-
neous creation of an identical trust that provides the first trust's
grantor with a life income interest of a like amount. The amount
transferred by the grantor to the crossed trust is not pulled back into
his estate as a matter of course by § 2036(a)(1), because the grantor
did not retain an income interest in the assets that he himself trans-
ferred. Indeed, the grantor in the crossed trust situation appears at
first blush to have neatly sidestepped § 2036(a)(1) because the in-
come in his trust goes not to himself but to another (i.e., the relative)
and, in turn, the life interest he receives is from a source (i.e., the
relative's trust) other than a trust he set up.
The facts in the seminal case on reciprocal trusts, United States v.
Estate of Gracel4 essentially involved such an arrangement. The set-
tlors of two crossed trusts in Grace were husband and wife.35 The
trusts, executed a mere two weeks apart, contained nearly identical
31. I.R.C. § 2036.
32. See id. § 2036(a)(1).
33. See id. § 2036(a)(2). Along the same lines, § 2037 applies to haul transferred
property back into a decedent's gross estate if the decedent/transferor retained a rever-
sionary interest valued at more than five percent. See id. § 2037(a). In addition, § 2038
applies to increase the gross estate when the decedent retained the power to reshuffle
beneficial interests created by the transfer even when he himself has no beneficial interest.
See id. § 2038(a).
34. 395 U.S. 316 (1969).
35. See id. at 318.
1997] 1787
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
terms.3 6 The husband's trust named the wife as the income benefici-
ary, and the wife's trust named the husband as the income
beneficiary. As described above, if each trust had named its own
settlor as the life beneficiary, the trust assets clearly would have been
includible in the estate of the respective settlor under the language of
the predecessor of § 2036(a)(1) then in effect, since each trust settlor
would have "retained" an "income" interest from the transferred as-
sets. 8 The issue in Grace was whether the government could utilize
the reciprocal trust doctrine to "uncross" the trusts and include the
value of the trust set up by the wife in the husband's estate. 9
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Grace, in part because
of a purported "conflict" in the lower courts involving proper appli-
cation of the reciprocal trust doctrine. The conflict derived from a
pre-Grace formulation developed in Lehman v. Commissioner, in
which the Second Circuit determined that trusts should be uncrossed
only upon a showing by the Service of a specific quid pro quo-i.e.,
that the trusts were made "in consideration" for each other. 41 Circuit
courts after Lehman, however, disagreed on just how the quid pro
quo showing could be met. Under one line of cases, quid pro quo
was purely a question of the subjective intent of the parties: did each
party intend for the two trusts to be set up "in consideration" for
each other? 43 The evidentiary inquiry generally was not permitted to
36. See id. at 319.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 320.
39. See id. at 317.
40. See id. at 318. The Court also granted certiorari because of "the importance of the
issue presented to the administration of the federal estate tax laws." Id.
41. 109 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1940). In Lehman, two brothers had simultaneously created
trusts for the benefit of each other for life, with remainders to the other brother's issue.
See id. at 100. Moreover, each trust allowed the beneficiary brother to withdraw $150,000
from the trust corpus. See id. The Lehman court acknowledged that had each brother
simply retained the right to withdraw the $150,000 from his own trust, the settlor's estate
would have been taxable to the extent of the withdrawal power under the predecessor of
§ 2038. See id. Under § 302(d) of the Revenue Act of 1926, the gross estate of a decedent
for purposes of estate tax included property "[t]o the extent of any interest therein of
which the decedent has at any time made a transfer by trust or otherwise where the en-
joyment thereof was subject at the date of his death to any change through the exercise of
a power either by the decedent alone or in conjunction with any person .... ." Revenue
Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-20, § 302(d), 44 Stat. 9, 71 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.
§ 811 (193.9)). The court "uncrossed" the trusts after determining that the trusts had each
been created in "consideration" for the other. See Lehman, 109 F.2d at 100.
42. See Lehman, 109 F.2d at 100.
43. See, e.g., Estate of Moreno v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 889, 891-92 (1957).
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extend far beyond the parties' own testimony on the point." The
other line of cases, which might be referred to as exemplifying the
"collateral evidence" analysis, allowed the government greater lati-
tude to use objective factors such as simultaneity in the execution of
the trusts, substantial similarity of terms, and the use of the same at-
torney to draft both trust instruments, to establish a quid pro quo."
Considering that the "conflict" among the circuits appeared in reality
to amount to little more than a disagreement over the appropriate
weight to give circumstantial evidence of an individual's mental state
(in this case, intent), the assertion that the grant of certiorari in
Grace was, in part, to resolve a conflict is in retrospect a bit curious.
Grace provided the Supreme Court with the opportunity to ad-
dress more serious flaws in the Lehman quid pro quo formulation.
In Grace, the husband had been a very wealthy man at the time of
his marriage. 6 His wife, however, entered the marriage with no as-
sets of her own.47 Over the course of the marriage, the husband
transferred substantial assets to his wife's name.48 The husband,
however, always controlled the family fortune and managed the fi-
nancial affairs. 49 The husband also was the driving force behind the
reciprocal trust arrangement in question, and entered into the ar-
rangement as part of an overall tax planning strategy.50
The lower court in Grace considered the circumstances sur-
rounding the establishment of the two trusts under both the
"subjective intent" and the "collateral evidence" analyses before
satisfying itself that no quid pro quo had existed.5 1 Under a subjec-
tive intent analysis, the court found no proof that the wife executed
her trust for her husband solely "in consideration" of his executing a
like trust for her.5 2 Rather, the court determined that the wife exe-
cuted her trust simply because her husband asked her to do so."
Under the collateral evidence analysis, by employing extraneous
44. In Estate of Carter v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 1148 (1959), the court explained that
the parties had relied completely on the testimony of the decedent's son-in-law to demon-
strate the alleged lack of consideration on the part of the grantor. See id. at 1152.
45. See, e.g., Orvis v. Higgins, 180 F.2d 537,540 (2d Cir. 1950).
46. See United States v. Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316, 318 (1969).
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 319.
51. See id. at 321-22.
52. See id. at 322.
53. See id. at 324 n.9.
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objective factors, the court came to the same conclusion. 4 The court
reasoned that the collateral evidence approach provided only a re-
buttable presumption of a quid pro quo." Accordingly, while
objective factors help to determine subjective intent, they would not
be used to vitiate a clear finding to the contrary." Thus, although the
timing of the trusts and the identity of the terms and advisors sug-
gested the possibility of a quid pro quo, the court found that the
evidence that the wife was not motivated by a quid pro quo carried
the day."
Justice Marshall, writing for the Supreme Court, declined to use
either the pure subjective intent or the collateral evidence analysis.5"
The Court reasoned that "[e]mphasis on the subjective intent of the
parties in creating the trusts, particularly when those parties are
members of the same family unit, creates substantial obstacles to the
proper application of the federal estate tax laws." 9 Quoting from its
prior decision in Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner,6" the Grace Court
noted that "'taxability of a trust corpus... does not hinge on a set-
tlor's motives, but depends on the nature and operative effect of the
trust transfer.' ,6
In addition, the Court noted that the search for consideration
was particularly vulnerable to abuse in the context of reciprocal
trusts: "[I]t is unrealistic to assume that the settlors of the trusts,
usually members of one family unit, will have created their trusts as a
bargained-for exchange for the other trust. 'Consideration,' in the
traditional legal sense, simply does not normally enter into such in-
trafamily transfers."6 2 Thus, the Court held that application of the
reciprocal trust doctrine is "not dependent upon a finding that each
54. See id. at 322.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id
58. See id. at 324.
59. Id at 323. Professor Stephen Cohen of Georgetown recently wrote an essay ana-
lyzing various tax opinions written by Justice Thurgood Marshall. See Stephen B. Cohen,
Thurgood Marshall: Tax Lawyer, 80 GEO. L.J. 2011 (1992). Professor Cohen concluded
that Justice Marshall wrote some of the most influential and well-reasoned recent opinions
in the tax area. See id. at 2040. Although Grace is not discussed in Professor Cohen's
essay, and is criticized slightly in this Article, Grace also is a daring and brilliant decision
in that it demonstrates Justice Marshall's skepticism regarding courts' use of the tax-
payer's motive in determining taxation, a quality noted by Professor Cohen with respect to
some of Justice Marshall's other opinions. See id. at 2012.
60. 335 U.S. 701 (1949).
61. Grace, 395 U.S. at 323 (quoting Spiegel, 335 U.S. at 705).
62. Id. at 324.
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trust was created as a quid pro quo for the other" because such a re-
quirement necessarily involves "a difficult inquiry into the subjective
intent of the settlors."63 The Grace Court set forth its new, now in-
famous formulation of the reciprocal trust doctrine: "[A]pplication
of the reciprocal trust doctrine requires only that the trusts be inter-
related, and that the arrangement, to the extent of mutual value,
leaves the settlors in approximately the same economic position as
they would have been in had they created trusts naming themselves
as life beneficiaries."'
' 4
This formulation, intended to supplant subjective inquiry with a
purportedly "objective" test, has proven as unworkable as its prede-
cessor, and has been criticized and sidestepped by courts in
subsequent decisions.6 5 The Grace Court's point is well taken that, in
a family setting, the notion of "consideration" as a yardstick for ap-
plication of the reciprocal trust doctrine is essentially anomalous and
irrelevant. However, the proffered replacement test suffers from as
many, if not more, defects as the Lehman formulation it attempted to
improve.
A. Weakness of the "Interrelatedness" Test
The "interrelatedness" test purportedly is designed to be objec-
tive, but its conclusory application in Grace provides little guidance
for subsequent cases. The Grace Court concluded curtly that under
the facts, it was "undisputed that the two trusts are interrelated.
They are substantially identical in terms and were created at ap-
proximately the same time."" No further elucidation of the test wasprovided,67 and the elastic categories of "substantially identical" and
63. Id.
64. Id. It was widely believed at the time that the Supreme Court's 1969 decision in
Grace would be the death knell for the use of reciprocal trusts to avoid taxation. See, e.g.,
C. Earl Ledden, Recent Decisions, 21 SYRACUSE L. REV. 357, 365 (1969) ("[O]ne may
reasonably conclude that the reciprocal trust is no longer a viable device for intended or
incidental tax savings."). Interestingly, the same was said about Lehman, the previous
major decision involving crossed trusts. See Howard 0. Colgan, Jr. & Robert T. Molloy,
Converse Trusts-The Rise and Fall of a Tax Avoidance Device, 3 TAX L. REV. 271, 273
(1947-48).
65. See Estate of Green v. United States, 68 F.3d 151, 155-56 (6th Cir. 1995); Estate of
Levy v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 910,912-14 (1983).
66. Grace, 395 U.S. at 325.
67. Even more troubling perhaps is that the Court included a footnote that seemed to
reinsert "consideration" into the mix:
We do not mean to say that the existence of "consideration," in the traditional
legal sense of a bargained for exchange, can ever [sic] be relevant. In certain
cases, inquiries into the settlor's reasons for creating the trusts may be helpful in
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"approximately the same time" seem poorly crafted to bring cer-
tainty and precision to the area.
Not surprisingly, the vague notion of "interrelatedness" has
since induced taxpayers to push the envelope with a variety of tech-
niques: executing the two crossed trusts several weeks or months
apart; varying several terms of arguable significance in the trusts; or
using two different attorneys to draft the trust instruments. 8 The
Tax Court has provided taxpayers with at least tacit support for such
attempts. In Estate of Levy v. Commissioner,69 the Service argued
unsuccessfully that under the reciprocal trust doctrine, the value of a
trust created by the decedent's wife for his benefit was included in
the decedent's estate, in light of a similar trust created by the dece-
dent for the benefit of his wife." Like Grace, Levy involved trusts
created by a husband and wife.7' The Levy trusts were created on the
same date and by the same attorneys, involved equivalent trust cor-
pora (an identical number of shares of corporate stock), and named
the same residuary beneficiary (the couple's son).72 In addition, the
wife was named the trustee of the husband's trust and the husband
was named trustee of the wife's trust.73 The Tax Court concluded
that the trusts were not interrelated and refused to uncross them.74
In finding that the trusts were not interrelated, the Tax Court
focused on a single term of the husband's trust that was not con-
tained in the wife's trust.75 The husband's trust granted the wife an
inter vivos special power of appointment in the trust income and
corpus. 76 No corresponding power of appointment was granted to
the husband by the wife's trust.77 The court reasoned that as a result
of the special power of appointment only in the wife, the parties had
"markedly different interests in, and control over, the trusts created
establishing the requisite link between the two trusts. We only hold that a finding
of a bargained-for consideration is not necessary to establish reciprocity.
Id. at 324 n.10.
68. These techniques were also available to avoid the rule in Lehman. See Colgan &
Molloy, supra note 64, at 296-97.
69. 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 910 (1983).
70. See id. at 911.
71. See id. at 910.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 911.
74. See id. at 914.
75. See id. at 911, 914.
76. See id. at 911. The power allowed the wife to appoint the income or the corpus to
any person or persons other than herself, her creditors, her estate, or the creditors of her
estate. See id.
77. See id.
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by each other. 78
Interestingly, the Service in Levy conceded that if the special
power of appointment had been a valid power, its inclusion in only
one of the trusts would have prevented the two trusts from being in-
terrelated.79  The Service's position, however, was that the power
granted to the wife was "subjectively worthless because [the wife]
was not likely to exercise her power of appointment.., to appoint to
anyone other than her son."8 Thus, according to the Service, that
term did not warrant distinguishing the two trusts.81 The Levy court
declined to venture into the subjective intent quagmire. Citing the
Grace Court's rejection of subjective intent in the crossed trust area,
the Tax Court ruled that taxability does not hinge on a settlor's mo-
tives, and that "[t]he subjective likelihood of [the wife] exercising her
power of appointment, whether due to her age, her love for her hus-
band, or some other motive, is completely irrelevant."8 2 The Levy
court did not have to determine, however, if an "objectively worth-
less" power would justify ignoring the power for purposes of the
reciprocal trust doctrine. 3 Rather, the court noted that the power in
question had "objective" value.84
Professor Joseph Dodge suggests that Levy "might be taken to
mean that a slight difference in the dispositive terms of the two trusts
is enough to avoid the reciprocal trust doctrine."8'5 Professor Dodge's
admonition regarding Levy has proven prophetic, and the implica-
tions of the decision have not been lost on the bar. Recently, a
practitioner advised that "[w]hen drafting trusts in [the mutual trust]
situation, the drafter should be sensitive to [the reciprocal trust] rule
and vary the terms of the two trusts to the extent necessary to avoid
an argument by the Internal Revenue Service that the trusts are re-
78. Id. at 912.
79. See id.
80. Id. at 913.
81. See id. First, the Service challenged the validity of the special power of appoint-
ment under the local state law. See id. The court analyzed the applicable local law and
disagreed with the Service's interpretation of it. See id. The court reasoned that when the
New Jersey trustee is given power to appoint to an infinite class other than himself, the
appointment is made in the discretion of the trustee. See id.
82. Id.
83. See id. at 914.
84. See id. at 913.
85. Dodge, supra note 26, at A-60. Professor Dodge qualifies this observation, how-
ever, by noting that the Tax Court in Levy emphasized the "value and significance of the
power of appointment." Id.
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ciprocal."'88  ,
Other practitioners have recently observed that if a husband and
wife yearn to settle personal residence trusts for each other, "and
both wish to have interests in each other's trust after the retained
term, it may be possible for the practitioner to draft the trust instru-
ments so that they will not be found to be 'interrelated.' "' Citing
Levy, these practitioners note that the Tax Court has already deter-
mined that a special power of appointment in one trust "was a
significantly different interest in the property, causing the trusts not
to be interrelated., 8  The authors suggest that "[to] make a finding
that the personal residence trusts are interrelated less likely, the
practitioner also could vary the interests in and control over the per-
sonal residence trusts."8 The following illustrations are provided:
For example, one trust could give the nongrantor spouse an
unrestricted discretionary interest in income and/or princi-
pal after the retained term .... In addition, one trust could
have beneficiaries in addition to the spouse, with all inter-
ests subject to the exercise of a third-party trustee's
discretion to allocate benefits under the trust. Moreover,
each trust could have a different trustee, but this difference
alone probably will not prevent a finding of interrelation-
ship. Finally, if the trusts are not created simultaneously,
they are less likely to be found to be interrelated."'
The interrelatedness. test, which seemed at the time of its pro-
nouncement to invite taxpayer challenges, has not disappointed in
this regard. Challenges have been frequent and successful.9
B. Narrow Interpretation of Mutual Economic Value
The second prong of the reciprocal trust doctrine, the require-
ment of a mutual economic value, has proven at least as problematic
as the interrelatedness test. The Grace Court explained the "mutual
economic value" requirement as leaving the taxpayers in the same
position as if they had "created trusts naming themselves as life
86. Leonard Wertheimer, III, Superior Estate Planning Documents: Going the Extra
Mile, 56 ALA. LAW. 150, 154 (1995).
87. Blattmachar & Slade, supra note 15, at A-19.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at A-19 to A-20.
91. See Estate of Levy v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 910, 911-14 (1983); Dodge,
supra note 26, at A-60.
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beneficiaries."'92 Read literally, the doctrine would seem to track
only the prohibition of § 2036(a)(1) (retained income interests) and
leave taxpayers free to use crossed trusts to circumvent § 2036(a)(2)
(retained powers).
This anomalous result was rejected by the Tax Court in Estate of
Bischoff v. Commissioner,9 3 in which the Tax Court applied the re-
ciprocal trust doctrine to uncross trusts where taxability hinged on
§ 2036(a)(2).94 In Bischoff, a husband and wife each created irrevo-
cable trusts for the benefit of their four grandchildren. 9 The trusts'
terms were identical except that the husband was named trustee of
the wife's trusts and the wife was named trustee of the husband's
trusts.96 The trustees in each case were granted the power to "apply
income and principal for the benefit of the beneficiary and to accu-
mulate income not so applied." 97 As in Grace, if the grantors of the
mutual trusts simply retained the rights given to the other grantor,
there would have been no question that the corpora of the trusts
would be includible in the grantor/decedent's gross estate under
§ 2036(a) (albeit, in this case under § 2036(a)(2) dealing with re-
tained powers, rather than under (a)(1) which deals with retained
income).98 The question in Bischoff was whether the trusts would be
uncrossed so as to cause inclusion under § 2036(a)(2).99
The Tax Court in Bischoff struggled with the awkward language
in Grace and reasoned that "[w]e simply are not convinced that the
Supreme Court intended to close a perceived loophole under section
2036(a)(1) and, at the same time, permit one to flourish under sec-
tion[] 2036(a)(2)." '' l The Tax Court explained that the purpose of
the reciprocal trust doctrine is "merely to identify the transferor of
property" where the trusts are interrelated, and that the mutual eco-
92. United States v. Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316, 324 (1969).
93. 69 T.C. 32 (1977).
94. See id. at 42-50.
95. See id. at 37.
96. See id.
97. Id.
98. The applicable provision was § 2036(a)(2) of the 1954 Code. See I.R.C.
§ 2036(a)(2) (1954). The language of § 2036(a)(2) is identical to the language found in the
current version of § 2036(a)(2) of the Code. See I.R.C. § 2036.
99. See Bischoff, 69 T.C. at 32.
100. Id. at 47. The court also mentioned that the loophole would allow taxpayers to
escape taxation under § 2038(a)(1). See id. The version in effect at the time was
§ 2038(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Its language is identical to the current
version in § 2038(a)(1) of the Code except for a revision in 1976 which substituted "during
the 3-year period ending on the date of the decedent's death" for "in contemplation of the
decedent's death." See Pub. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976).
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nomic value portion of the analysis is satisfied when there is a basis
of taxation of the uncrossed trusts."' The court reasoned that "the
doctrine's application is only part of a two-step process of taxation,
i.e., it is not enough merely to 'uncross' the trusts, there must also
exist a basis for their taxation."''2 According to the Bischoff court,
the Grace Court's reference to "the 'same economic position ... as
life beneficiaries' was merely its formulation of the basis of taxation
on the facts before it."'03
In a footnote, the Tax Court provided an alternative method for
reading the mutual economic value test as applicable in the context
of retained powers under § 2036(a)(2).' 4 The Bischoff court noted
that "were the level of 'economic' retention a relevant factor... it
could not be denied that a power to control the 'purse strings' in
many an instance would be just as gratifying as a retained life es-
tate."'0 5
Interestingly, while avoiding the second prong of the reciprocal
trust doctrine has been, for practitioners in the area, as fertile a topic
as eluding the "interrelatedness" test, their interpretation of the
"mutual economic value" test generally appears to be consistent with
the Service's and Tax Court's interpretation in Bischoff. Recently,
noted tax specialists have reasoned that "[flor the reciprocal trust
doctrine to cause adverse estate tax consequences, there not only
must be a finding that the trusts are interrelated, there must also be a
finding that the trust property [when uncrossed] is subject to estate
tax. 1016 These practitioners explain that the only interests that may
be safely cross-granted are those such as purely discretionary inter-
ests that, even if uncrossed, would not require inclusion under the
retained interests and powers provisions of the estate tax laws.
0 7
101. Id. at 46.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 46 n.16.
105. Id. (quoting United States v. Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316, 324 (1969)).
106. Blattmachar & Slade, supra note 15, at A-20.
107. See id. Conventional wisdom with regard to the estate tax is that a settlor can be
included in the class of beneficiaries of a purely discretionary trust without causing the
assets to be pulled into his gross estate under § 2036. See Dodge, supra note 26, at A-23 to
A-24. This holds true as long as there is no implied agreement between the trustee and the
settlor requiring the payment of income to the settlor. This outcome relies on interpreta-
tions of the terms "retained" and "income" found in § 2036. In essence, the Service and
the courts have reasoned that a settlorlbeneficiary's stake in a purely discretionary trust is
a "mere expectancy" and does not rise to the level of a "retained" right to income. See id.
The logic behind the exclusionary rule is similar to gift-back theory. An example of a true
gift-back illustrates the rationale that the grantor of a discretionary trust has not
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Notwithstanding the fundamental logic of the Bischoff "basis of
taxation" analysis and its apparent acceptance by the practicing bar,
the Sixth Circuit, in Estate of Green v. United States,05 soundly re-
jected Bischoff and refused to uncross trusts to cause inclusion under
§ 2036(a)(2).'O The Green case involved facts very similar to those in
Bischoff."' In Green, the husband settled a trust for the benefit of
one of the couple's granddaughters, naming his wife as trustee."'
That same day, the wife settled a trust for the benefit of the couple's
other granddaughter, naming her husband as trustee.' The terms of
the trusts, except for the identity of the beneficiaries, were virtually
identical."3 In each trust, the trustee was given the discretion to dis-
tribute or accumulate income from the trust until the respective
"retained" the income. For example, assume Sister gives Brother Blackacre. Without any
prearrangement, Brother subsequently gives part of the rents or occupancy to Sister.
Section 2036 does not apply because there is no "retention" of benefits. What Sister got
back was the result of an independent act of another.
This example is an adaptation of one provided by Professor Dodge in his portfolio on
retained interests and powers. See id. at A-23. A discretionary trust that specifically in-
cludes the settlor among the ranks of beneficiaries is distinguishable, however, from a true
gift-back where the donor has no knowledge or expectation of a return from his gift. See
id. By naming himself as a beneficiary, the settlor distances the transaction from the true
gift-back situation. Moreover, a self-settled discretionary trust is unlike a true gift-back
because in the trust context the party making distributions to the settlor (i.e., the trustee)
does so without any personal economic sacrifice. See id. Despite these distinctions, how-
ever, a self-settled discretionary trust is deemed not to be caught by the actual language of
§ 2036.
There is, however, a negative side to the interpretation of the settlor/beneficiary's in-
terest in a discretionary trust as only a mere expectancy. That is, the settlor's beneficial
interest is viewed as something less than an "interest" capable of valuation. See id. at A-
24. Accordingly, for gift tax purposes, the gift is considered complete as to the entire
amount transferred with no reduction for any possible retained benefit or interest by the
settlor. See id. Moreover, if the trustee of the discretionary trust were, in fact, to make
distributions to the settlor/beneficiary, such distributions would be counted in the settlor's
gross estate under § 2033 even though the settlor had already paid a gift tax on the trans-
fer and no credit would be given to the settlor for the amount of the tax paid. See id. This,
of course, would be the same double tax result that would obtain under a true "gift-back."
See id. For a discussion of how local law creditor access rules could affect this conclusion,
see Elena Marty-Nelson, Taxing Offshore Asset Protection Trusts: Icing on the Cake?, 15
VA. TAX REV. 399, 427-39 (1996).
108. 68 F.3d 151 (6th Cir. 1995).
109. See id. at 153.
110. See id. at 151; supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text. One difference between
the facts of Green and Bischoff is that the beneficiaries of the Green trusts were not identi-
cal. This factual distinction, as the dissent in Green notes, should not bar application of the
Grace reciprocal trust doctrine since in Grace itself the beneficiaries were not identical.
See Green, 68 F.3d at 154 (Jones, C.J., dissenting).
111. See Green, 68 F.3d at 152.
112. See id.
113. See id.
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beneficiary reached the age of twenty-one.' 4 As in Bischoff, had the
settlor named himself as the trustee of his own trust and retained
powers to accumulate and distribute income, the corpora of the
trusts certainly would have been includible under § 2036(a)(2). The
Green court determined, however, that "[a]ssuming, arguendo, that
contrary to the district court's conclusion, the trusts in the instant
case were interrelated... , the reciprocal trust doctrine would never-
theless be inapplicable.,
115
According to the majority in Green, the reciprocal trust doctrine
could not apply in that case for the simple reason "that the set-
tlor/trustee retained fiduciary powers to reinvest income and time
distribution of trust income and corpus until the beneficiaries reach
21 years of age do[es] not constitute a retained economic benefit that
satisfies the core mandate of Grace."' 1 6 As articulated by the major-
ity in Green, the crux of Grace was that " 'the arrangement, to the
extent of mutual value, leaves the settlors in approximately the same
economic position as they would have been in had they created trusts
naming themselves as life beneficiaries.' ,,.7
The majority in Green dismissed the Tax Court's decision in
Bischoff as a "strained and attenuated interpretation" of the mutual
economic value language of Grace."" Without citing any cases, the
court in Green referred to Bischoff as "a decision rejected by every
circuit which has considered the application of the reciprocal trust
doctrine."' 9
This attempt to dispose of Bischoff summarily is curious, not
only because of the lack of substantiation for the claim regarding
Bischoff's universal rejection by appellate courts, 2' but also because
such a curt dismissal fails to address the two arguments in favor of
114. See id.
115. Id. at 153 n.2. The lower court in Green had determined that the trusts were not
interrelated even though they were created on the same date, the terms were substantially
identical, and the authority vested in each trustee was the same. See id. at 152.
116. Id. at 154.
117. Id. (quoting United States v. Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316,324 (1969)).
118. Id. at 153.
119. Id.
120. No circuit court has explicitly rejected Bischoff. Moreover, the Federal Circuit in
Exchange Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 694 F.2d 1261 (Fed. Cir. 1982), relied on the
Bischoff court's analysis in applying the reciprocal trust doctrine to crossed custodial pow-
ers under the Florida Gift to Minors Act. See id. at 1267-69. The Federal Circuit Court in
Exchange Bank expressly stated: "We agree with the majority in Bischoff and the appel-
lee in this action that the reciprocal trust doctrine merely identifies the true transferor, but
the actual basis for taxation is founded upon specific statutory authority." Id. at 1269.
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application of the reciprocal trust doctrine articulated in Bischoff.
The Tax Court in Bischoff reasoned that the power to "control the
'purse strings'" could amount to an economic value that in some
cases would be equal to or greater than a retained income interest."'
The Bischoff court's other rationale for application of the reciprocal
trust doctrine in the case of crossed powers was that the Supreme
Court in Grace would not have wanted to close the loophole in
§ 2036(a)(1), while leaving open the loophole in § 2036(a)(2). 2
The majority in Green alluded to the economic value argument
of retained powers but, without explanation, classified such powers
as "non-economic."'' The majority concluded that it would not
"extend the reciprocal trust doctrine to include retained non-
economic discretionary fiduciary powers including powers to reinvest
and time distribution of trust income and corpus until the core man-
date of retained economic benefits by the settlor/trustee has been
satisfied."', 4
The majority's conclusion that the discretionary power to accu-
mulate income is not an economic power ignores the persuasive
reasoning of Bischoff. As the court in Bischoff recognized, Congress
has determined that when a grantor retains certain powers (whether
technically classified as "economic" or not), the trust assets are in-
cludible in the grantor/decedent's estate." This principle was given
life in Bischoff under the "basis of taxation" rubric: once trusts are
found to be interrelated, they will be uncrossed if there exists a
"basis of taxation.', 2 6 The Bischoff court recognized that the basis of
taxation could be derived under § 2036(a)(2) as easily as under
§ 2036(a)(1)." Thus, a power need not be classified as an
"economic" power to be the foundation for estate tax inclusion, and
the Green majority's preoccupation with that issue was misplaced.
The majority in Green failed to explain the weaknesses, if any,
in the Bischoff "basis of taxation" answer to the § 2036(a)(2) loop-
hole. Rather, the majority simply noted that previous cases had not
applied the reciprocal trust doctrine to "non-economic" crossed
powers.' In a footnote, the Green majority asserted that virtually
121. See Estate of Bischoff v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 32,46 n.16 (1977).
122. See id. at 47.
123. See Green, 68 F.3d at 154 n.3.
124. Id. (emphasis added).
125. See Bischoff, 69 T.C. at 46.
126. Id.
127. See id. at 46-47.
128. See Green, 68 F.3d at 154 n.3.
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every case applying the reciprocal trust doctrine, other than Bischoff,
did so under facts where the grantors of the trusts retained what
amounted to life interests or" 'substantial economic benefits.' ,129
The dissent in Green stopped short of embracing the Bischoff
"basis of taxation" argument. While not insisting on a "substantial
economic value," the dissent seemed to require an economic value of
some sort. The dissent conceded that "[i]n Grace, the Supreme
Court concluded that application of the reciprocal trust doctrine was
appropriate because the transactions left the parties in the same eco-
nomic position as they were before the creation of the trusts.""'3 The
dissent noted, however, that "[t]he same has occurred with the
Greens. 13' According to the dissent, the "[p]arties in Grace main-
tained their economic positions through retention of a life estate,
where the Greens' [sic] maintained their economic positions through
retention of the power to designate whom would enjoy the trust as-
sets. ,
32
The dissent's interpretation in Green of the second prong of the
reciprocal trust doctrine, consistent with the Bischoff court's ap-
proach, restored the primacy of substance in analyzing the transfers.
However, the dissent unfortunately left open the question as to what
amounts to an "economic" position. The Bischoff court's interpreta-
tion, by contrast, set the judiciary's role where it belongs. Under the
"basis of taxation" theory, it is Congress's role to decide what is tax-
able, and the court's function in applying the reciprocal trust
doctrine is simply to determine the true grantor under the facts of
particular trusts.
III. CROSSED TRUSTS TO AVOID THE INCOME TAX GRANTOR
TRUST RULES
In the income tax area, much more so than in the estate tax area,
Congress has passed legislation to ensure that the substance of a
trust arrangement is properly taxed. For example, the grantor trust
rules are designed to prevent taxpayers from shifting income to
lower tax bracket taxpayers when the grantors do not actually relin-
quish control of the trust property.'3 3 Congress determined that the
129. Id. at 154 n.1 (quoting Bischoff, 69 T.C. at 45).
130. Id. at 156 (Jones, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Estate of Grace, 395 U.S.
316, 324 (1969)).
131. Id. (Jones, J., dissenting).
132. Id. (Jones, J., dissenting).
133. See Belcher & Bridgeman, supra note 30, at 24.
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trust vehicle should be respected for income tax purposes only when
the grantor actually parts with dominion and control of the prop-
erty. 134
Section 671 is the operative provision of the grantor trust rules
set forth in §§ 671 through 679 of the Code.135 It provides that when
a trust is deemed a grantor trust, the trust is ignored for tax purposes
as a separate tax entity and all items of income, deductions, and
credits are includible in the grantor's income tax return.3 6 Sections
673 through 679 of the Code contain detailed rules for determining
when a trust is a "grantor trust" subjecting the grantor to income tax
liability.'37 Generally, those sections deem a grantor to be the owner
of trust assets when: (1) the trust is revocable;138 (2) trust income can
be used to benefit the grantor;'39 (3) the grantor enjoys self-serving
administrative powers over the trust;1 40 (4) the grantor retains the
134. See Robert A. Parr, Combining Defective Grantor Trusts with Other Types of
Trusts, 21 EST. PLAN. 82,82 (1994).
135. See I.R.C. §§ 671-79 (1994). The grantor trust rules are set forth in subpart E of
Part I of subchapter J of the Code. See id. Trusts not covered by the grantor trust rules
are governed by subparts A through D of subchapter J. See id. §§ 641-68.
136. See Belcher & Bridgeman, supra note 30, at 24. If the grantor trust rules do not
apply, the income accumulated in the trust is taxed to the trust as the technical owner of
the property under the rules of subparts A through D of subchapter J of the Code. See
I.R.C. §§ 641-68. It is important to note that not all violations of the grantor trust rules
would require the entire trust to be ignored for tax purposes. For example, if the grantor
retained only an interest in the income, only the portion of the trust related to income
would be affected. See Howard M. Zaritsky, Grantor Trusts: Sections 671-679, 2d. Tax
Mgmt. Rep. (BNA) No. 452, at A-8 to A-9 (1996).
137. See I.R.C. § 673-79. Section 679, applicable to foreign trusts, considers a foreign
trust to be a grantor trust if it has a United States beneficiary, even if the grantor retains
no control. See id. § 679.
138. See id. § 676(a). Section 676, entitled "Power to revoke," provides in subsection
(a) that
[t]he grantor shall be treated as the owner of any portion of a trust, whether or
not he is treated as such owner under any other provision of this part, where at
any time the power to revest in the grantor title to such portion is exercisable by
the grantor or a non-adverse party, or both.
Id. Subsection (b) provides that the power to revoke will not cause inclusion under the
grantor trust rules if such power generally may not be exercised any time before an event
that has a five percent or less probability of occurring. See id. § 676(b).
139. See id. § 677(a). Section 677 applies if the income from the trust may be distrib-
uted to, held for the future use of, or used to pay insurance premiums for the benefit of the
grantor or the grantor's spouse, unless the power to exercise such income for such uses
cannot arise prior to an event that has a five percent or less probability of occurring or
unless the consent of an adverse person is necessary. See id. In addition, § 677(b) provides
that income that may be used to discharge a legal obligation of support of the grantor is
deemed available for the use of the grantor but only to the extent that the income is so
used. See id. § 677(b).
140. See id. § 675. Section 675 provides generally that the grantor shall be treated as
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power to designate recipients of trust income or principal, unless that
power is duly confined;"' or (5) the grantor keeps a reversionary in-
terest worth over five percent of the value of the trust at its
inception. 42
In Krause v. Commissioner,141 trust income was deemed taxable
under the grantor trust rules then in effect based on application of
the reciprocal trust doctrine.'" Although the tax scheme in Krause
has been overruled by subsequent legislative changes to the grantor
trust rules, 45 Krause remains instructive for application of the recip-
rocal trust doctrine outside the estate tax area.
In Krause, the taxpayers, husband and wife, had simultaneously
created six trusts.Y4 6  The husband's trusts were funded with fifty
the owner of any portion of the trust in respect of which he: (1) retains a power to deal for
less than adequate and full consideration; (2) retains a power to borrow without adequate
interest or security; (3) borrows, and the borrowing extends over one taxable year; or
(4) retains a power of administration that allows him to (a) vote stock of a controlled cor-
poration held in the trust; (b) control investment of trusts funds in a controlled
corporation; or (c) reacquire trust assets by substituting property of equivalent value. See
id. § 675(1)-(4).
141. See id. § 674. Section 674(a) provides, as a general rule, that a grantor is taxed on
the portion of the trust over which the grantor or a non-adverse party has the power to
dispose of the beneficial enjoyment of income or principal without the consent of an ad-
verse party. See id. § 674(a). However, § 674(b) provides that the following powers do not
require inclusion under the general rule: (1) a power to apply income for the support of a
dependent; (2) a power affecting the enjoyment only after the occurrence of an event that
has a five percent or less probability of occurring; (3) a power exercisable only by will; (4)
a power to allocate among charities; (5) a power to distribute corpus under an ascertain-
able standard; (6) a power to withhold income temporarily; (7) a power to withhold income
during disability; (8) a power to allocate between income and corpus; (9) a power to dis-
tribute, apportion, or accumulate income or corpus among a class of beneficiaries held by
an independent trustee; and (10) a power to distribute, apportion, or accumulate income
among beneficiaries that is limited by an ascertainable standard. See id. § 674(b)-(d).
142. See id. § 673(a). Section 673 provides that the grantor is treated as the owner of a
trust in which she has a reversionary interest in corpus or income, at the trust's inception,
which exceeds five percent of the value of such portion. See id. The two exceptions to this
rule apply if the beneficiary is a lineal descendant of the grantor or the reversionary inter-
est does not take effect unless the beneficiary dies prior to reaching age 21. See id.
§ 673(b).
Under current grantor trust rules, a grantor is also deemed to be the owner of trust
assets if the grantor's spouse holds such trust powers or interests. See id. § 672(e). In ad-
dition, if an individual who is not "adverse" to the grantor or who is "related" or
"subordinate" to the grantor possesses the administrative powers of § 674 or § 675, or the
distributive powers of § 677, the grantor would be deemed the owner of the trust. See
Thomas W. Abendroth, Grantor Trusts Are Now Useful Planning Tools, 47 TAX'N FOR
ACCT. 240,241 (1991).
143. 497 F.2d 1109 (6th Cir. 1974).
144. See id. at 1111.
145. The grantor trust rules in effect were I.R.C. §§ 671 and 678 (1954).
146. See Krause, 497 F.2d at 1110.
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shares of certain corporate stock and the wife's trusts were funded
with twenty-five shares of the same corporate stock. 7 The six trusts
named the same non-beneficiary, non-grantor persons as trustees.
The husband's three trusts named the couple's children as primary
beneficiaries.'49 The wife's three trusts designated the couple's
grandchildren as primary beneficiaries. 5 Under each trust, however,
the trustees had discretionary power to accumulate trust income, to
terminate the trusts within twelve years of their creation, and to ap-
ply any or all principal and accumulated income at termination either
to the primary beneficiaries or to the grantor's spouse.' Thus, in
effect, the husband was a beneficiary of the wife's three trusts and
the wife was a beneficiary of the husband's three trusts.
Under current grantor trust rules, a grantor is taxed as the
owner of any portion of a trust whose income may be distributed to
his or her spouse."2 However, the grantor trust rules then in effect
dictated grantor trust treatment only when the trust income could be
applied for the grantor directly.53 The Service argued that once the
reciprocal trust doctrine uncrossed the trusts, each grantor would be
taxable under the applicable rules because the income could be used
to benefit the grantor."4
The taxpayers in Krause argued that the statutory scheme of the
grantor trust rules precluded application of any anti-tax avoidance
doctrines such as the reciprocal trust doctrine. 5 The Tax Court ac-
knowledged that § 671 of the grantor trust rules provides that" '[n]o
items of a trust shall be included in computing the taxable in-
come.., of the grantor... under section 61 (relating to [the]
definition of gross income) or any other provision of this Title except
as specified in this subpart.' ,,156 The court reasoned, however, that
such language in "section 671 merely precludes the applicability of
any other [Code] section in taxing the grantor on the income of the
trust," and "does not prevent the use of the reciprocal-trust doc-
147. See id. The children's and the grandchildren's trusts were also funded with $100.
See id.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. These facts were developed in the lower court. See Krause v. Commissioner, 57
T.C. 890, 893 (1972), affd, 497 F.2d 1109 (6th Cir. 1974).
152. See I.R.C. § 677 (1994).
153. See supra note 145.
154. See id.
155. See Krause, 57 T.C. at 899.
156. Id. at 901 (quoting I.R.C. § 671 (1954)).
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The taxpayers also argued that by subsequently changing the
grantor trust rules to tax grantors where trust income could benefit
the grantor's spouse, Congress sanctioned crossed trusts for such
purposes prior to the legislative change.5 Unpersuaded, the Tax
Court reasoned that when Congress amended the grantor trust rules
to include instances where the grantor's spouse could benefit from
income, it "clearly was not attempting to deal with a reciprocal trust
[since t]he reciprocal-trust doctrine covers not only husband and
wife, but brother and sister, parent and child, and very possibly two
complete strangers.'
' 59
Having determined that there was no barrier inherent in the
grantor trust legislative scheme to application of the doctrine, the
Tax Court applied the doctrine to the Krause trusts. First, the trusts
were interrelated in that "all were created on the same day, named
the same trustees and contained identical provisions."'"6 The Tax
Court then appeared to utilize a precursor to the "basis of taxation"
analysis for application of the reciprocal trust doctrine-an analysis
on which it would later expand in Bischoff.6' The Krause court rea-
soned that "the reciprocal-trust doctrine is applied only so that this
Court can determine whether in fact petitioners are taxable under
the grantor trust provisions. '' 1 After uncrossing the trusts and
"treating each petitioner as the grantor of the trust created by his or
her spouse,"" the court held that each grantor was taxable under the
157. Id. The last sentence of § 671 provides:
No items of a trust shall be included in computing the taxable income and credits
of the grantor or of any other person solely on the grounds of his dominion and
control over the trust under section 61 (relating to definition of gross income) or
any other provision of this title, except as specified in this subpart.
I.R.C. § 671. The Krause court's rationale for dismissal of the argument based on the
statutory language sidestepped the fact that grantor trust rules were designed in part to
supersede the "dominion and control" principles developed out of Helvering v. Clifford,
309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940). The reciprocal trust doctrine, however, clearly would not be
caught by the language of the last sentence of § 671, because that doctrine neither relies on
"dominion and control" nor rests in another provision of "this Title."
158. See Krause, 57 T.C. at 901.
159. Id. at 901 n.8. The court's reference to "and very possibly two complete strang-
ers," id., went beyond the extent of the grantor trust rules as conceived by any prior case
or administrative ruling.
160. Id. at 900.
161. See Bischoff v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 32, 45-46 (1977).
162. Krause, 57 T.C. at 901.
163. Id.
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applicable grantor trust rules.'6
Interestingly, the Sixth Circuit in Krause, the same court that
later rejected application of the reciprocal trust doctrine in Green,
affirmed the Tax Court's holding that the taxpayers were taxable on
the trust income to the extent of mutual value (i.e., to the extent of
the income on the twenty-five shares of stock per trust).165 Moreover,
the Sixth Circuit in Krause adopted the Tax Court's reasoning with
regard to application of the reciprocal trust doctrine in the grantor
trust situation in its entirety: "After careful consideration of the
relevant trust provisions and the authorities cited by taxpayers, we
hold that the Tax Court correctly decided this issue for the reasons
set forth in its opinion.
1 66
IV. CROSSED TRUSTS TO BENEFIT FROM GIFT TAX RULES
One reason reciprocal trusts enjoyed such popularity in the
early part of this century was that, if the trusts were not
"uncrossed"-that is, if the taxpayers could avoid application of the
reciprocal trust doctrine-not only was estate tax avoided for the as-
sets in trust, but there was no gift tax on the transfer to the trust .
67
That advantage was of course reduced with the reintroduction of a
gift tax in 1932.168 However, between 1932 and 1976, the gift tax rates
were significantly lower than the estate tax rates.169 Accordingly, re-
ciprocal trusts were utilized to take advantage of the lower rates.
Even today, however, with the uniform gift and estate tax rates
164. See id. at 902. The court determined that the taxpayers were taxable under then-
§ 677(a)(2), which provided that a grantor is taxable under a trust "held or accumulated
for future distribution to the grantor or the grantor's spouse." Id. The uncrossing was
necessary, despite the language referring to the grantor's spouse in § 677(a)(2), to refute
the last sentence of § 677(a), which provided that the subsection did not apply "to a power
the exercise of which can only affect the beneficial enjoyment of the income for a period
commencing after the expiration of a period such that the grantor would not be treated as
the owner under section 673." I.R.C. § 677(a) (1954). The Tax Court reasoned that the
last sentence did not apply in this case since Treasury Regulation § 1.677(a)-I(f) (current
version at Treas. Reg. § 1.677(a)-l(f) (1996)) provided that if income is "'to be accumu-
lated for 10 years and then ... may be distributed to the grantor, the grantor is treated as
the owner of the trust from its inception.'" Krause, 57 T.C. at 902 (quoting Treas. Reg.
§ 1.677(a)-l(f)).
165. See Krause v. Commissioner, 497 F.2d 1109, 1112 (6th Cir. 1974).
166. Id. at 1112 (citation omitted).
167. See John G. Steinkamp, Common Sense and the Gift Tax Annual Exclusion, 72
NEB. L. REV. 106, 110-13 (1993). The estate tax was enacted in 1916, but it was not until
1924 that the first gift tax was enacted. See id. For a complete legislative history of the
gift tax, see id. at 110-13.
168. See id. at 111.
169. See id. at 110-11.
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introduced by the Tax Reform Act of 1976,170 there are still advan-
tages to gift rather than estate tax treatment in certain cases for
assets transferred to trusts. Basically, gift tax treatment allows a do-
nor to make a gift of property with significant appreciation potential
instead of retaining the property in his estate in order to remove the
post-transfer appreciation from the donor's transfer tax base. For
example, if the grantor expects that the assets in the trust (e.g., secu-
rities) will appreciate significantly, it may be advisable to pay the gift
tax on the date-of-transfer value, rather than the estate tax on the
date-of-death value.
172
In addition, even with the uniform rates, the "effective" gift tax
rate is lower than the estate tax rate.' The disparity in effective
rates exists because the gift tax is applied on the net gift (net of the
tax), whereas the estate tax is applied on the estate pre-tax. 74 This
distinction is conventionally expressed as the gift tax base being "tax-
exclusive" and the estate tax base being "tax-inclusive."'" Thus, tax-
payers may prefer gift tax treatment to benefit from this disparity.
The possibility of utilizing the lower "effective" gift tax rate is of
course thwarted if "uncrossing" the trusts would cause inclusion in
the estate under the retained interest or powers sections of the estate
tax provisions. However, by far the most important continuing fea-
ture of the gift tax rules for purposes of reciprocal trusts is the annual
170. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520. Prior to the revision of the Tax Reform Act of
1976, the gift and estate taxes were separate taxes with different rate structures.
171. See Dodge, supra note 26, at A-79.
172. Determining whether a completed gift (and the corresponding payment of gift
taxes) is preferable to inclusion of the assets in the grantor's estate requires a financial
analysis comparing the alternatives. For a discussion setting forth the formulas for making
this determination, see id. at A-79 to A-83.
173. See Theodore S. Sims, Timing Under a Unified Wealth Transfer Tax, 51 U. CHI. L.
REV. 34,35 (1984).
174. See id. at 39-40. In his article on the need for comprehensive estate and gift tax
reform, David Brockway provides the following example of the benefit of the divergence
in "effective" tax rates:
[U]sing the 39.6 percent rate ... to illustrate the point, the inclusion of an addi-
tional $100 in the taxable estate would give rise to an estate tax of $39.60, leaving
$60.40 after tax to be transferred to the intended beneficiary. If, however, the
$60.40 net transfer was made as an inter vivos gift, the gift tax would only be
$23.90 (39.60 percent of $60.40).
David H. Brockway, Comprehensive Estate and Gift Tax Reform, 67 TAX NOTES 1089,
1096 (1995).
175. See Sims, supra note 173, at 40. In order to obtain the benefit of the lower effec-
tive gift tax rate, however, the donor would have to survive three years from the date of
the transfer and thereby avoid § 2035(c). See I.R.C. § 2503(c) (1994). For a thorough
discussion of § 2035, see Cremer, supra note 27.
[Vol. 751806
TAXING RECIPROCAL TRUSTS
exclusion. As some practitioners have noted, "[aifter unification of
the estate and gift taxes, reciprocal trusts still serve the purpose of
permitting the transfer of appreciable assets out of the estate under
the shelter of annual gift tax exclusion.'
76
Generally, the gift tax acts as a backstop to the estate tax.177 A
gift tax is imposed on lifetime transfers of property shifted out of the
grantor's gross estate.'78 Section 2501(a) of the Code is the operative
provision, and it imposes a tax for each calendar year on the transfer
of property by gift during such calendar year by any individual.'79
Section 2511(a) provides that the § 2501 gift tax shall apply "whether
the transfer is in trust, or otherwise," and "whether the gift is direct
or indirect."'80 There is, however, an annual exclusion that affords
taxpayers relief from the gift tax system for certain gifts. Section
2503(b) provides that the first $10,000 of gifts of present interests
made to any person by the donor during the calendar year shall not
be included in the total amount of gifts made during such year.'
The legislative history of the annual exclusion reveals that it was
designed, in part, to make the gift tax politically acceptable.' When
first establishing the annual exclusion, Congress explained that it
would serve to exclude customary and occasional gifts, such as wed-
ding and holiday presents. 3 This limited purpose explains why the
exclusion is not without limitations.' It applies to present interests,
not future interests.' Moreover, it is limited on a per-donee basis.' 6
176. Jacques T. Schlenger et al., Reciprocal Trusts May Not Be Used to Create Present
Interests for Gift Tax Purposes, 12 EST. PLAN. 239, 239 (1985).
177. See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 28, 9.01, at 9-2.
178. See Dodge, supra note 26, at A-2. Generally, the estate and gift taxes (transfer
taxes) are taxes on donative transfers of property. See id. The tax is applied on cumula-
tive lifetime gifts (not including annual exclusions) and the taxable estate at the death of
the donor. See id. The cumulative transfer is taxed at the progressive tax rates set forth in
§ 2001. See I.R.C. § 2001. There is a credit of $192,800 against this transfer tax which has
the effect of exempting the first $600,000 of cumulative transfers from the tax base. See
Dodge, supra note 26, at A-2.
179. See I.R.C. § 2501. Section 2501(a) provides that "a tax, computed as provided in
section 2502, is hereby imposed for each calendar year on the transfer of property by gift
during such calendar year by any individual, resident or non-resident." Id. § 2501 (a).
180. Id. § 2511(a). Section 2511(a) also provides that the gift tax will apply whether
the property is real or personal, tangible or intangible. See id.
181. See id. § 2503(b).
182. See Steinkamp, supra note 167, at 106.
183. See H.R. REP. No. 72-708 (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2), at 457, 478; S.
REP. No. 72-665 (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2), at 496-525; Steinkamp, supra note
167, at 117.
184. See Steinkamp, supra note 167, at 106.
185. See I.R.C. § 2503(b).
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The first case dealing with crossed gifts involving the annual ex-
clusion was Furst v. Commissioner,'87 decided prior to Grace. Three
sets of married donors were involved in Furst: two brothers and a
cousin, and their wives.'" Over two days, each set of married donors
transferred the same number of shares of a certain corporation's
stock to members of their immediate family and to individuals in
each of the other two family groups.'89 None of the donors paid a gift
tax on the transfers, claiming that the transfers fell within the appli-
cable per-donee annual exclusion amount.'90 The Service issued
notices of tax deficiency to the taxpayers, claiming that the gifts the
donors made "to members of their immediate families, and cross
transfers to others, amounted to gifts of all stock transferred by each
to members of their immediate families," and therefore limited the
exclusion amount to the per-donee limit in the immediate family.'9'
The Tax Court agreed with the Service that the "realities of the
transfer" controlled the gift tax liability of the donors. '2 It con-
cluded that "each petitioner was the real donor of the stock which
the members of his or her immediate family ultimately received and
the number of exclusions is ruled by the number of recipients in each
petitioner's family."'93 Finding no cases involving crossed gifts, how-
ever, the court in Furst borrowed from the reciprocal trust doctrine,
as developed in Lehman,'94 to tax the substance of the crossed gifts:
"While we do not find any cases involving cross-gifts, there is ample
authority for [uncrossing the gifts] in the reasoning and conclusion
reached in the reciprocal or cross-trusts cases."'95
The Furst court did not seem troubled by, nor did it address di-
rectly, the quid pro quo requirement of Lehman. Indeed, the donors
denied that there had been any prior arrangement or agreement
among the parties, and conceded only that there "might have been
some talk" among the transferors before the transfers were made.'96
The uncrossing, it appears, was based almost entirely on the
186. See id.
187. 21 T.C.M. (CCH) 1169 (1962).
188. See id. at 1170.
189. See id.
190. See id. at 1171. The per-donee annual exclusion amount with the split spousal
election at the time was $6000. See id. at 1170 n.2.
191. Id. at 1172.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. For discussion of Lehman, see supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
195. Furst, 21 T.C.M. at 1172.
196. Id.
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''simultaneous" nature of the "transfers of identical property" and
the attempt at circumventing a "taxing statute that reaches gifts
'direct' or 'indirect.' "97 If so, Furst represents a broad reading of the
reciprocal trust doctrine, similar to the reading later adopted in
Bischoff-i.e., that it serves to identify the transferor. 9
The first major case to address crossed gifts after Grace was
Schultz v. United States.'99 In Schultz, a taxpayer gave equal amounts
of stock to each of his three children and to each of his brother's
three children.2 0 On the same day, the taxpayer's brother gave the
same amounts of stock to each of the taxpayer's three children.20'
The taxpayer claimed an annual exclusion for the gifts to his chil-
dren, nieces, and nephews.20 2 The lower court held that the actual
intent of the taxpayer was immaterial and that the only issue was the
nature and operative effect of the transfers themselves; thus, it di-
rected a verdict for the Service.2 3 The court of appeals did not reach
the issue of whether the rule of Grace applies with equal force to in-
direct gifts. 214 Instead, the court affirmed the directed verdict
because a reasonable jury could have concluded only that the tax-
payer intended to benefit his children-rather than his brother's
children-by the gifts in question.2 5
Faced with this less than conclusive resolution from the courts as
to whether the reciprocal trust doctrine after Grace applied in the gift
area, the Service published Revenue Ruling 85-24,06 attempting by
administrative fiat to end the use of crossed gifts to expand the an-
nual exclusion. The ruling, in which the donees obtained lapsing
withdrawal powers in certain interests in trusts, addressed the issue
of whether crossed annual gifts in trusts would be uncrossed."7 Spe-
cifically, three business partners had simultaneously established
three trusts funded with $20,000 each.20 ' Every partner named his
197. Id.
198. In his excellent article on the gift tax, Professor Steinkamp observes that Furst
anticipated the holding in Bischoff that the reciprocal trust doctrine's function is merely to
identify the true transferor. See Steinkamp, supra note 167, at 135.
199. 493 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1974).
200. See id. at 1225.
201. See id.
202. See id.
203. See id. at 1225-26.
204. See id. at 1226.
205. See id.
206. Rev. Rul. 85-24, 1985-1 C.B. 329.
207. See id.
208. See id.
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own children as beneficiaries of $10,000 and the other two partners
as beneficiaries of $5,000 each.2" The terms of each trust provided
that trust income would be accumulated for the benefit of the chil-
dren and distributed when they reached age forty.21 Each trust
provided, however, that the children could withdraw up to $10,000
from the trust for a sixty-day period following establishment of the
trust.211 The trusts also provided that each business partner benefici-
ary had the power to withdraw up to $5,000 from the trust during the
sixty-day period after creation of the trust.2 2 Similar withdrawal
powers would apply to any future additions to the trusts.2 3 Each
grantor/partner filed a gift tax return showing the transfer of $20,000
in trust as gifts of $5,000 to one partner, $5,000 to the other partner,
and $10,000 to his child.2 4 The partners claimed gift tax annual ex-
clusions for the full amount of the trust transfers (i.e., $20,000).15
The Service acknowledged that "[w]hen a trust instrument gives
a beneficiary the power to demand immediate possession of corpus,
the beneficiary has received a present interest," thus falling within
the requirement of the annual exclusion that the gift be a present in-
terest and not a future interest.216 The Service reasoned, however,
that the powers of withdrawal held by the partners were not genuine
because each partner's ability to withdraw $5,000 from another's
trust would likely trigger similar withdrawals by the other partners
from the other trusts.2 7 Thus, the Service reasoned that the with-
drawal powers would never be exercised.2 8 Citing Grace, the Service
determined that "[w]hen two donors establish similar trusts under
circumstances such that the beneficial interests are matching, the
transfers may be treated as reciprocal whether or not the transfers
were actually in consideration for each other., 2 9 Accordingly, the
Service ruled that each partner would be allowed a $10,000 exclusion
for the amount transferred to his own children but that no other ex-
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. Id. The Service conceded in the ruling that Crummey v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d
82 (9th Cir. 1968), stood for this proposition. See Rev. Rul. 85-24, 1985-1 C.B. 329.
217. See Rev. Rul. 85-24, 1985-1 C.B. 329.
218. See id.
219. Id.
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clusions would be allowable for the transfers.22 °
V. NEED FOR RECIPROCAL TRUST DOcTRINE
Judge Learned Hand, writing for the Second Circuit in Helver-
ing v. Gregory,22' acknowledged that "[a]ny one may so arrange his
affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to
choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not
even a patriotic duty to increase one's taxes. '2  Creative taxpayers
can and do arrange their transactions so as to minimize the applica-
ble tax consequences, and there is little disagreement that such
stratagems within the system are acceptable. However, somewhere
in the continuum, otherwise acceptable machinations rise to a level
of manipulation that cannot be tolerated without jeopardizing the
integrity of the taxing scheme. In such circumstances, courts face a
dilemma: Should they reach beyond the words of the tax statute in
question and impose a "substance" requirement on the transaction,
or must they wait for a legislative "solution"? 223 The argument is
persuasive that the courts' role in the proper administration of the
tax laws would be severely circumscribed if the laws could not be ap-
plied to the substance of the transaction.224 This principle certainly
applies to the use of the corollary reciprocal trust doctrine for ne-
220. See id. Two years later, the Service issued a private letter ruling utilizing the
analysis of Revenue Ruling 85-24 to address a situation in which two brothers and their
wives made almost identical gifts to the members of each other's families. See Tech. Adv.
Mem. 87-17-003 (Jan. 8, 1987). The issue was whether the gifts by each donor to his or her
nieces and nephews would be "treated as made instead to the donor's own children,
thereby causing the total gifts for each donor to exceed the available annual gift tax exclu-
sions." Id. The Service cited Bischoff for the proposition that "the reciprocal trust
doctrine is intended to identify the transferor of property." Id. (citing Bischoff v. Commis-
sioner, 69 T.C. 32 (1977)). The Service reasoned that the indirect nature of the "transfers
is very similar to the way the taxpayer made gifts in Schultz." Id. (citing Schultz v. United
States, 493 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1974)). Accordingly, the Service concluded that the trans-
fers made by each couple to the children of the other should be treated as gifts to their
own children and that the aggregate value of such gifts made to each donee exceeded the
annual gift tax exclusion allowable. See id.
221. 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), affd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
222. Id. at 810.
223. In the tax area, there also is often the subsidiary question of whether the govern-
ment's pronouncements regarding the statute (typically in the form of Treasury
Department regulations) should be given weight if they, in effect, add to the legislative
scheme. There are no Treasury Regulations applicable to crossed-trust arrangements. For
a discussion of the proper weight courts should accord general and legislative regulations,
see Caroline Elizabeth Costle, Note, Judicial Deference to Interpretive Regulations in the
Face of Inconclusive Legislative History: The Example of Nalle v. Commissioner, 47 TAX
LAw. 259 (1993).
224. See Baillif, supra note 7, at 294-97; Brown, supra note 1, at 226.
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gating crossed trusts or gifts. But questions remain with respect to
the reciprocal trust doctrine.
In applying the reciprocal trust doctrine, the courts need to de-
cide whether to uncross interrelated transfers where the uncrossing
would result in tax liability, as suggested in Bischoff,2z or only where
the taxpayers maintained a substantial economic benefit, as sug-
gested by the Green court.226 A related question is whether
application of the doctrine should depend on the type of tax in ques-
tion (i.e., gift, estate, or income tax).
In answering these questions, it is helpful to recall the birth of
the substance-over-form doctrine itself. Gregory v. Helvering27 is
widely regarded as the genesis of that doctrine.228 In that case, the
taxpayer wanted to benefit from a provision in the Code that allowed
for tax-free corporate reorganizations in order ultimately to obtain
capital gains, rather than dividend, treatment on the sale of the un-
derlying assets of her closely held corporation. 229  The taxpayer
wanted to obtain the proceeds from a sale of the underlying assets of
a corporation whose stock she owned.2" If the corporation had sold
the assets and then distributed the proceeds to her, she would have
been taxed on the distribution at the high dividend rates.f' If the
corporation instead sold the assets to another corporation that in
turn liquidated, the gain on the sale of the assets would be capital
gains and the liquidation would be tax-free. 2 The taxpayer formed
a new corporation, which purchased the assets of her first corpora-
tion and liquidated it. The taxpayer claimed that the liquidation fell
under a specific provision of the Code allowing for tax-free reorgani-
zations?23 Although the liquidation of the second corporation fell
within the literal terms of the reorganization statute, the Court re-
characterized the transfer as a taxable dividend.24  The Court
determined that the substance of the transaction did not fall within
the intended legislative scheme for tax-free reorganizations, which
225. See Bischoff v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 32,45-46 (1977).
226. See Estate of Green v. Commissioner, 68 F.3d 151, 153 (6th Cir. 1995).
227. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
228. See Brown, supra note 3, at 170.
229. See Gregory, 293 U.S. at 467.
230. See id.
231. See id.
232. See id.
233. See id.
234. See id. at 469-70.
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are a matter of legislative forbearance. "
In Gregory, the taxpayer was foiled from utilizing a provision of
the Code absolving a transfer from taxation when the substance of
that transfer did not fit the spirit of the provision. 6  Similarly,
crossed-gift situations present the case of a taxpayer attempting to
benefit from transfers that do not fit the per-donee annual exclu-
sion. 7 In the crossed-gift situation, the taxpayer is in effect making
more than the allowed per-donee gifts to the true intended donee.
There is a subtle, yet important, difference between (1) using
crossed transfers (whether direct or in trust) to enlarge the $10,000
annual gift tax exclusion, and (2) using crossed transfers to avoid the
estate tax or the grantor trust rules of the income tax. In the gift tax
situations, unlike the other two, if the crossed trusts are not
"uncrossed," the taxpayer benefits from a statutory relief provision
in a situation where Congress clearly did not intend that benefit to
apply. By contrast, in the estate tax and income tax situations, by
crossing the powers or interests in the trusts, the taxpayers escape
the literal words of the Code. In those cases, if the crossed trusts are
not "uncrossed," the taxpayer is not "obtaining" a statutory tax
benefit beyond the legislative scheme. Rather, "uncrossing" the
trusts in the estate or income tax situations results in tax liability that
would not be imposed absent the "uncrossing."
The gift tax annual exclusion scenario presents the easiest case
for application of the reciprocal trust doctrine because the court's
role in such a case fits well within typical substance-over-form analy-
sis and arguably amounts to little more than proper statutory
interpretation. As the Second Circuit noted in Estate of Levine v.
Commissioner,'8 "we cannot be unmindful of the rule of construc-
tion that Congress permits exclusions only as a matter of grace, and
the exclusions sections are to be strictly construed against the tax-
payer.12
39
235. See id.
236. See id. at 467-69.
237. See I.R.C. § 2503(b) (1994).
238. 526 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1975).
239. Id. at 721. Similarly, Justice Souter, in his concurring opinion in United States v.
Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992), noted the rule of statutory interpretation that "exclusions from
income must be narrowly construed." See id. at 248 (Souter, J., concurring). This reason-
ing notwithstanding, in Cristofani v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 74 (1991), the Tax Court
rejected the Service's invocation of substance-over-form to deny annual gift tax exclusions
for gifts to holders of contingent trust interests with limited withdrawal powers. See id. at
84-85. Responding to Cristofani, the Service recently announced that it "will continue to
litigate cases whose facts indicate that the substance of the transfers was merely to obtain
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By contrast, in the grantor trust scenarios, applying the recipro-
cal trust doctrine would result in taxation not required under the
literal terms of the statute. Moreover, the grantor trust legislative
scheme is quite complex and therefore perhaps should not be tam-
pered with by the courts. The latter argument, however, was
addressed and dismissed in Krause.2 4 In that case, the Sixth Circuit
did not accept the taxpayers' argument that the intricate nature of
the grantor trust rules signified a legislative monopoly of the area
precluding the use of the reciprocal trust doctrine.24 In addition,
similar judicially created anti-abuse doctrines clearly apply in the
grantor trust area.242 For example, even if the terms of a trust avoid
the technical provisions of the grantor trust rules, a grantor will be
taxed on income anticipatorily assigned to a trust under the
"assignment of income" doctrine. 243 Arguably, the reciprocal trust
doctrine requires less judicial interference in the legislative scheme
than the assignment of income doctrine. Viewed in its true light, the
reciprocal trust doctrine is solely a means to identify the true trans-
feror.2 In this limited role, the doctrine clearly has a place even in
the intricate scheme of the grantor trust rules.
The estate tax cases, while perhaps not as compelling as the gift
tax annual exclusion cases, also present the argument for application
of the reciprocal trust doctrine. In the estate tax area, however, it is
especially vital that the doctrine is understood in its proper light.
The reciprocal trust doctrine should be viewed solely as a mechanism
for determining the true "transferor," not as an invitation for courts
to rewrite the legislative scheme based on vague notions of sub-
stance. In this light, the doctrine should be utilized to unravel any
crossed "income interests" for estate tax purposes as well as any
crossed "powers." The reciprocal trust doctrine taxes transfers that
would in form circumvent the legislative intent.
The speed with which the reciprocal trust doctrine has been
dismantled in recent court decisions cannot be explained by the doc-
trine's purported analytical flaws alone. Two external factors appear
to have especially fueled the full frontal assault on the doctrine: first,
annual exclusions and that no bona fide gift of a present interest was intended." Cristofani
v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 74 (1991).
240. See Krause v. Commissioner, 497 F.2d 1109, 1110 (6th Cir. 1974).
241. See id.; supra notes 143-66.
242. See Zaritsky, supra note 136, at A-1, A-4.
243. See id. Similarly, sale-leaseback arrangements are carefully scrutinized to see if
rent payments to the trusts should be deductible regardless of any technical compliance or
non-compliance with the terms of the Code provisions. See id. at A-5 to A-6.
244. See id. at A-8.
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a reluctance by courts to "undo" trusts on the somewhat vague asser-
tion of "substance" out of deference to the notion that trusts
themselves are by their very nature creatures of "form" and that a
judicial doctrine which tends to disregard "form" chips away at the
very foundations of this area of the law;245 and second, a recent cur-
rent of "judicial passivity" in the tax area as Congress has assumed
an increasingly preeminent role in federal tax matters.26 Finally, it is
possible that several of the recent overly narrow interpretations of
the reciprocal trust doctrine were rendered for the specific purpose
of encouraging clearer legislative pronouncements in the area.
Whatever the full explanation, the recent emasculation of the
reciprocal trust doctrine is ill-advised not only for its creation of
overly generous tax loopholes, but also for the negative implications
it may have in other areas. Determining the "true" settlor of a trust
can affect, among other things, the proper application of the laws
245. For example, courts have refused to apply a substance-over-form analysis to pre-
vent taxpayers from utilizing multiple trusts as separate taxpaying entities. The Tax Court
in Estelle Morris Trusts v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 20 (1968), determined that "by recog-
nizing even one trust for tax purposes, [Congress] sanctions to some degree income
splitting and the resulting lessening of taxes." Id. at 39. Thus, the court concluded, multi-
ple trusts represent only a difference of degree, not a qualitatively distinct phenomenon.
The Tax Court in Morris Trusts also noted that Congress had not enacted a provision
making a tax avoidance motive determinative of tax liability in the trust area, as it had in
other areas of tax law (such as §§ 269, 306, 482, 532, 1551). See id. Accordingly, the Tax
Court reasoned that it would "limit those judicially developed doctrines ('tax avoidance,'
'business purpose,' and 'sham') to the situations which they were intended to cover." Id. at
43. The Morris court further stated that the "business purpose" test of Gregory v.
Helvering was inapposite to the multiple accumulation trusts at issue in the case. See id.
Since 1986, the use of multiple trusts to reduce taxes has virtually been eliminated.
Congress challenged income-shifting on two fronts. First, Congress curtailed "tax bracket
shopping" both for income accumulated in the trust and income doled out to the benefici-
aries. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13202, 107
Stat. 312, 416; H.R. REP. No. 99-841 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4075, 4855.
For accumulated income, Congress squeezed the tax brackets for trusts so that almost all
trust income would be taxed at the highest marginal rate. See Gary C. Randall & Susan L.
Megaard, Defective Grantor Trusts Can Be Effective Education Funding Vehicles After
RRA '93, 81 J. TAx'N 150, 150-51 (1994). The 1993 Revenue Reconciliation Act ("RRA
'93") provided that the highest individual marginal tax rate of 39.6% would govern trust
income over $7,500, as adjusted for inflation. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993, § 13202, 107 Stat. at 416. Accordingly, the income tax savings occasioned by in-
come-shifting to the trust in the hopes of earning the tax rate for trust accumulation of
income are nominal. Similarly, the "kiddie tax" provisions of the 1986 Tax Reform Act
("TRA '86"), which tax unearned income over $1000 of children under 14 at the parent's
highest marginal rate, curtailed the use of trusts to obtain a lower rate on distributions to
the trust beneficiaries. See H.R. REP. 99-841 (1986).
246. For a proposal that would all but eliminate the courts from the mix in at least one
area of substance-over-form litigation, see Baillif, supra note 7, at passim.
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regarding creditor access to trusts. 7  For example, it is well-
established that where a person creates a spendthrift trust for his
own benefit, a so-called "self-settled" trust, a spendthrift provision
restraining the reach of creditors to the trust assets is ineffective to
block creditor access.21 In determining whether a trust is self-settled,
potential creditors have for years successfully relied on tax cases for
the proposition that "where one person creates a trust for another in
consideration of the other's creating a similar trust for him, each is in
substance creating a trust for himself., 241 In short, the post-Grace
disinclination by courts to uncross trusts may tend to jeopardize the
ability of creditors to get their hands on assets of a settlor of a trust
to which they are otherwise entitled. A viable reciprocal trust doc-
trine, on the other hand, would greatly assist creditors, who could
argue that a judicially mandated uncrossing shows that a particular
trust was in fact "self-settled," and the assets therefore should be ac-
cessible to creditors.20
In the taxing scheme and related areas, the intended purpose of
the reciprocal trust doctrine is to identify the true grantor. In order
to serve this purpose, the spirit of the Grace decision must be fol-
lowed. The best recent articulation of that decision is found in the
Tax Court's Bischoff holding that interrelated trusts should be un-
crossed, giving rise to taxability. The courts can give teeth to the
interrelatedness prong by requiring taxpayers who enter into trans-
fers at similar times with similar terms to rebut a presumption that
the transfers are interrelated. By placing a high burden on the tax-
247. See 2A AUSTIN WAKELAND ScoTr & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW
OF TRUSTS § 156.3, at 180-82 (4th ed. 1987).
248. See id. § 156, at 165 n.1.
249. Id. § 156.3, at 181.
250. The fall into disfavor of the reciprocal trust doctrine is, additionally, an ill harbin-
ger for efforts to utilize the substance-over-form doctrine to iron out disparities between
the treatment of domestic trusts and the treatment of transfers of assets by United States
citizens to foreign trusts via so-called offshore asset protection trusts ("OAPTs"). Com-
mentators have argued that OAPTs enjoy advantages unavailable to domestic trusts
because courts allow the OAPTs' "form" to govern their accessibility to creditors. Domes-
tic trusts have historically been scrutinized by American courts to determine if, in
substance, the trust is self-settled and thus subject to creditor access. See Elena Marty-
Nelson, Offshore Asset Protection Trusts: Having Your Cake and Eating It Too, 47
RUTGERS L. REV. 11, 75-80 (1994). By contrast, foreign self-settled trusts are generally
shielded from creditors, notwithstanding any implied agreements or side arrangements
among the parties. See id. The recent "exalt[ation] of artifice over reality," see supra text
accompanying note 2, in the discrediting of the reciprocal trust doctrine, reflecting yet
another setback for the doctrine of substance-over-form, can be viewed with some appre-
hension as a setback also for the notion of leveling the playing field between domestic
trusts and OAPTs by subjecting both to a careful substance analysis. Id.
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payer to disprove interrelatedness, courts can minimize the likeli-
hood that taxpayers will be able to circumvent that prong of the
Grace test. With regard to the "mutual economic value" require-
ment, the Bischoff court's "basis of taxation" analysis properly limits
the judiciary's role, while not tying its hands as does the Green
court's formulation.

